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Introduction 
 
The River Congo – Africa’s Sleeping Giant 
Regional Integration and Intersectoral Conflicts in the Congo Basin 
Tobias von Lossow 
Making greater use of the waters of the Congo could boost development across – and 
beyond – the region, but threatens to favour particular users’ interests at the expense 
of others. Within its enormous catchment area, the Congo is the dominant transport net-
work and the lifeblood of the African rain forest, upon which millions depend for their 
livelihoods. Tapping the river’s resources could significantly improve the region’s water 
and food supplies, while its hydro-energy potential could theoretically satisfy the elec-
tricity needs of the entire continent. Plans to construct more major dams at the Inga Falls 
demonstrate that the ten Congo Basin states are pursuing common goals – but also hav-
ing to deal with sharpening intersectoral conflicts. An inconsistent line on dam-building 
makes it harder for Germany to play a constructive role in these development processes. 
 
When funding for the Inga 3 dam was sus-
pended in summer 2017, the government 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) called on potential investors to 
replan the project, preferably on a larger 
scale. This sent a clear message that the 
DRC intends to forge ahead with the con-
troversial hydro-power expansion, where 
the associated boost to mining poses con-
siderable risks for the gigantic river system. 
At more than 4,700 kilometres, the 
Congo is Africa’s second-longest river after 
the Nile. It rises in the equatorial high-
lands, flows the length of Africa’s largest 
rain forest, and drains into the Atlantic on 
the continent’s west coast. After the Ama-
zon it is the world’s second-largest river by 
volume, discharging 41,000 cubic metres 
per second. The Congo is eleven kilometres 
wide in places, and up to 220 metres deep; 
its catchment area is the largest in Africa 
(3.7 million square kilometres, or about 
ten times the size of Germany). Countless 
branching tributaries, waterways and canals 
criss-cross Central Africa, creating a dendri-
tic network totalling 25,000 kilometres (see 
map, p. 2). The Congo is the lifeblood of Cen-
tral Africa’s socio-economic development: 
most important regional transport network, 
pulse of a gigantic ecosystem, Africa’s 
largest body of fresh water, and the world’s 
greatest reserve of untapped hydro-power. 
Congo I: Transport and Navigation 
The Congo represents the prime means of 
transport in a region whose roads are poor 
and often impassable in the rainy season, 
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Map: The Congo River Basin 
 
railways run down, and flights scarce and 
expensive. Many more remote settlements 
are reachable only by water, making the 
river the only transport infrastructure for 
significant parts of the population. Espe-
cially from eastern DRC, it often takes 
weeks to reach the capital Kinshasa, with 
passengers generally travelling on cargo 
barges. Commerce also depends heavily on 
the waterways: officially more than 1.5 mil-
lion gross register tonnes are transported 
annually between Bangui and Kinshasa. The 
actual volume is even greater, as freight in 
the informal sector – which accounts for 
the bulk of transported goods – generally 
goes unrecorded. 
Despite its crucial importance for trans-
port, the Congo’s shipping infrastructure is 
deficient: ports lie in ruins, jetties crumble, 
signals and (warning) signs are neither 
maintained nor renewed. Crews are often 
poorly trained, and accidents a regular 
occurrence on the treacherous waterway. 
Every year more than one thousand lives 
are reported lost through storms, naviga-
tion errors and incidents involving poorly 
maintained and overloaded vessels; the true 
figure is certainly higher. 
Accidents with hazardous loads cause 
risks to the environment. While the enor-
mous volume of the Congo can absorb pol-
lutants better than most, the frequency of 
such incidents is increasing. Another prob-
lem is the illegal “taxes” collected along cer-
tain stretches by local networks and crimi-
nal gangs. This side-effect of inadequate 
state control severely hampers passenger 
and freight traffic. Especially in the south-
eastern and northern parts of the basin, 
shipping also struggles with falling water 
levels caused by declining rainfall. The flow 
of the Oubangui for example, an important 
tributary in the north, has fallen by one-
fifth over the past forty years. Sections that 
were once navigable year-round can now 
be used no more than two hundred days 
per year, leaving certain settlements cut 
off from the outside world. 
Congo II:  
Ecosystem and Biodiversity 
The Congo is inseparably bound up with 
the rain forest it flows through, which is 
the world’s second-largest. The river system 
and its wetlands form the arteries of the 
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tropical rain forest, supplying the water for 
its humid climate. The forest’s precipitation 
in turn supplies large quantities of water to 
the river’s middle reaches. About 50 percent 
of the Congo’s water cycle occurs here, with 
evaporation from the rain forest accounting 
for 75–95 percent of the region’s rainfall. 
The Central African rain forest is the 
world’s most diverse, home to more than 
10,000 plant species and 2,500 animal spe-
cies, including two-thirds of all primates. 
With the rain forest holding the equivalent 
of up to 39 billion tonnes of CO2 – corre-
sponding roughly to total global emissions 
in 2016 – the Congo’s water regime influ-
ences the global as well as regional climate. 
About the same quantity of CO2 again is 
held in the basin’s peatlands and wetlands. 
This critical ecosystem faces massive 
threats, with logging and mining steadily 
eating away at the forest. An area of about 
2,000 square kilometres is lost each year, 
with effects much wider than the immedi-
ate destruction of forest and loss of diver-
sity. As the ecosystem’s capacity to store and 
release water is degraded, precipitation and 
river flow decline too, endangering the very 
existence of the rain forest, hampering navi-
gation and degrading hydro-power poten-
tial. In many places climate change is also 
reducing rainfall, as reflected in falling wa-
ter levels in the upper and middle reaches. 
Congo III:  
Water Supply and Agriculture 
The Congo is by far the largest African river; 
its annual discharge of 1.3 trillion cubic 
metres is about ten times the Nile’s and five 
times the Zambezi’s. The river contains about 
one-third of the continent’s fresh water. 
On top of providing the region with an ad-
equate supply of drinking water, this would 
be enough to irrigate about 60,000 square 
kilometres of agricultural land and improve 
the precarious food security situation. 
Presently, however, little use is made 
of the Congo’s resources. Domestic water 
supplies are appalling across the basin. Less 
than 10 percent of DRC households have a 
mains supply; only 26 percent of the popu-
lation enjoy adequate access to clean drink-
ing water. While the figures for the other 
Congo Basin states are slightly better, poor 
water management and lack of funds still 
leave most of the population dependent on 
shallow wells or untreated surface water, 
and as a consequence exposed to grave 
health risks and elevated mortality. 
A similar picture is found in the food 
supply, which falls far short of needs and 
potential. There are few irrigation projects 
of any size in the Congo Basin; given the 
high precipitation most agriculture is rain-
fed. And most of the population practise 
subsistence farming. As a result of under-
developed agricultural structures, all ten 
Congo Basin states are net importers of 
food, including grain, maize and rice. 
Congo IV:  
Hydro-power 
The Congo basin accounts for 13 percent 
of global hydro-power potential, equivalent 
to 100,000 MW. That would be enough to 
supply the current electricity needs of the 
entire continent of Africa. Moreover, con-
ditions are favourable: steep gradients in 
places, suitable geological formations, high 
flow rate and strong pressure, and a large 
volume subject to comparatively small 
annual fluctuations. 
To date, however, less than 3 percent of 
this potential has been tapped. While there 
are about forty barrages altogether, only 
the Inga dams south of Kinshasa generate 
significant amounts of electricity:  
 Inga 1 was completed in 1972 with rated 
output 351 MW. 
 Inga 2 came on stream in 1982 and gen-
erates up to 1,424 MW.  
 Inga 3, with a capacity of 4,800 MW, was 
scheduled to be built as first stage of the 
Grand Inga project from 2017 onwards, 
costing u13 billion. 
 Grand Inga is planned to unfold in several 
stages, ultimately generating 40,000 MW 
(or almost half of Africa’s current elec-
tricity demand). This would be the world’s 
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largest hydro-electric project, with 
a projected cost of around u50–60  
billion. 
Hydro-power has been slow to develop, 
on account of high costs, the fragile secu-
rity situation and a poor investment en-
vironment in recent decades. In fact, even 
the installed capacities are not fully used. 
Inga 1 and Inga 2 run at under 50 per-
cent, partly because maintenance has been 
neglected. At the same time the region suf-
fers a lack of electricity. In DRC less than 
10 percent of the population have access 
to electricity, and economic development 
is severely constrained. For example, in 
southern DRC mines often operate at reduced 
capacity or suspend operations because of 
electricity shortages. In some cases opera-
tions have been abandoned for good, and 
new mine developments lie on ice. 
Motor of Regional Integration: 
Conflict and Cooperation among 
Congo Basin States 
Ten states possess parts of the Congo Basin: 
the DRC with 62 percent, Central African 
Republic (11 percent), Angola (8 percent), 
the Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazza-
ville; 7 percent), Zambia (5 percent), Tan-
zania (4 percent), Cameroon (2 percent), 
and Gabon, Burundi and Rwanda (each less 
than 1 percent). Such a small proportion 
of the Congo’s water is actually used that 
classical rivalries over use and distribution 
are practically irrelevant. Alongside the 
large volume of water, the geography also 
inhibits conflict: the DRC holds the upper, 
middle and lower reaches, and a significant 
proportion of the basin’s rainfall occurs 
within its territory. Certain stretches of the 
Congo and the Oubangui mark the DRC’s 
border, with particular legal ramifications. 
Dam projects on such border stretches 
obviously require both sides to cooperate. 
The upshot of all this is that control of 
the Congo is politically largely uncontro-
versial. DRC basically regards the river as its 
own, and the other states see little reason 
to demur because water use has always 
been discussed and planned in a regional 
context. Moreover, several states would 
profit from such measures. Finally, DRC 
requires partners to tackle major hydraulic 
engineering projects. Other Congo Basin 
states investing here expect a certain 
degree of control over the river’s resources. 
The only discussion capable of stirring 
conflict is the idea of pumping water to 
other basins, which reappears at intervals. 
Since the 1980s plans have been put for-
ward to connect the Congo basin with 
the Nile or the Niger, or to ameliorate the 
ecological disaster of the rapid drying of 
Lake Chad. Such water transfer proposals 
are asking for trouble, and have gradually 
persuaded DRC to place greater emphasis 
on the river’s transboundary character – 
in order to secure its interests through a 
basin-wide cooperation framework with 
international support and monitoring. 
The starting point for a largely harmoni-
ous cooperation was navigation. The river 
system connects important inland ports 
and connects the states of the Great Lakes 
Region to the Atlantic. In 1999 Cameroon, 
the Central African Republic, the Republic 
of Congo and the DRC established the Kin-
shasa-based Commission Internationale du 
Bassin Congo-Oubangui-Sangha (CICOS) to 
improve conditions for navigation on the 
Congo. Its mandate was expanded in 2007 
to include transboundary water manage-
ment, turning CICOS into a coordinating 
and advisory body whose remit includes 
expanding agricultural irrigation. The 
experience of successful cooperation over 
navigation encouraged the member states 
to throw greater political weight behind 
CICOS. Gabon joined in 2010, followed by 
Angola in 2016. Cooperation within the 
Commission also has a moderating influ-
ence on other unconnected conflicts be-
tween its members, including DRC’s terri-
torial disputes with the Republic of Congo 
and with Angola. 
Alongside navigation – but largely out-
side CICOS – the development of hydro-
electric power, especially at the Inga Falls, 
is a central pillar of cooperation. All the 
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Congo Basin states suffer inadequate elec-
tricity supplies and share similar goals and 
interests in this area. Moreover, a regional 
political and economic heavyweight out-
side the basin is also pushing for develop-
ment of Congo hydro-power: South Africa 
hopes to still its growing energy needs with 
comparably cheap imported electricity. 
DRC has agreed to supply South Africa with 
2,500 MW generated at Inga 3 from 2021 – 
more than half its planned output. 
Intersectoral Conflicts and the 
Dominance of Mining 
While there is little international dispute 
over water in the Congo Basin, direct and 
indirect intersectoral conflicts of goals are 
certainly visible. Projects seeking to inten-
sify the river’s utilisation, as pushed jointly 
by states in the basin, stoke such conflicts 
by reinforcing existing imbalances between 
sectors, accelerating negative trends, and 
frequently degrading the ecosystem. For 
example, improvements to the water sup-
ply and irrigation lead to increasing dis-
charge of untreated sewage and pesticides 
entering the rivers. 
Incomparably greater are the conse-
quences of the massive expansion of hydro-
power sought by all the states and welcomed 
and encouraged by the African Union, the 
African Development Bank and the New Part-
nership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), as 
well as by the mining industry. Completion 
of Grand Inga in particular would make a 
huge contribution to African electrification 
and development – but a significant in-
crease in electricity generation would lead 
to a noticeable expansion in mining with 
consequential harm to the ecosystem. 
Mining directly impairs water quality when 
toxic substances contaminate rivers, and 
flow rates fall because mining is very water-
intensive. When new mines are opened and 
export infrastructure constructed, river 
levels are also reduced indirectly: expansive 
logging interferes with the functioning of 
the entire river system, accelerating the 
drop in precipitation. Lower water levels 
restrict navigation, constraining mobility of 
the population. Conditions also worsen for 
water supply and food production, and the 
amount of electricity generated at the dams 
falls – and here the circle is complete – with 
negative impacts on mining. 
Unlike other African river basins, extrac-
tive industries represent the most important 
branch of the Congo’s economy and have 
particular influence on water infrastruc-
ture projects. The mining sector is pressing 
for intensified exploitation of deposits in 
the eastern part of the Congo Basin and in 
the Copperbelt stretching across Zambia 
into southern DRC and Angola. To date a 
deficient electricity supply has prevented 
exploitation of deposits of cobalt, coltan, 
copper and gold (with the region contain-
ing more than 50 percent of known global 
cobalt reserves). For a long time the enor-
mous expense, unattractive investment 
climate and fragile security situation meant 
that the Inga project was simply not viable. 
But rapidly growing global demand for raw 
materials and rising commodity prices have 
changed the calculus and spurred willing-
ness to invest. The Inga 3 project was ini-
tiated in 2015 with a price tag of about 
u13 billion, although funding is currently 
suspended and Kinshasa is weighing how 
to move forward. The first binding commit-
ments to invest in the Grand Inga mega-
project – whose realisation seemed a pipe-
dream just a few years ago – came in 2015. 
With mining in northern South Africa – 
especially diamonds and iron ore – ready 
to benefit from an expanded electricity sup-
ply, Pretoria is also prepared to make a 
major contribution. South Africa’s enthu-
siasm for hydro-power received a boost 
after the country’s supreme court blocked 
an ambitious deal for Russia to build eight 
nuclear power plants in April 2017. The 
expansion of coal-fired power generation 
has also been delayed, and the planned 
reduction in coal-fired power from 90 per-
cent today to two-thirds of the energy mix 
by 2030 will certainly require alternative 
capacities, too. 
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The socio-economic situation in the 
Congo Basin makes greater use of the river 
almost inevitable. But if the resources – 
and the opportunities they generate – are 
to remain available in the long term, over-
utilisation will have to be prevented, the 
interests of all users and sectors will have 
to be taken into account, and the ecosystem 
will have to be adequately protected. Other-
wise there is a risk of drastic ecological 
repercussions extending beyond the region 
– and even the continent, not only with 
respect to climate change. The Congo Basin 
states have a narrow path to tread: The 
paradox they find themselves confronting 
is that they urgently need to develop the 
riverine resources – while exactly that en-
dangers the underlying functioning of the 
river system, together with its immense 
potential. 
Questions of Principle for 
Germany and Europe 
The particular sensitivity of the questions 
associated with the utilisation of the Congo 
are predicated on its geographical, climatic 
and socio-economic dimensions: Because 
the river is so large, positive and negative 
developments are greatly amplified. The 
German government has been arguing 
for more than a decade for CICOS to be ex-
panded, and has implemented measures to 
improve river navigation, concentrating on 
training for captains, pilots and mechanics. 
Such capacity-building initiatives have gone 
down well because their effects are long-
term and felt beyond the Congo Basin. With 
the GETRACO project (Gestion Transfronta-
lière de l’Eau dans le Bassin du Congo) the 
German development cooperation agency 
GIZ has been financially and institutionally 
involved in the Congo basin. The project 
was extended by another three years in 
2016, evidencing its material success, con-
fidence-building role, and continuity. 
In view of the impending expansion of 
water utilisation, Germany and its Euro-
pean partners should contribute even more 
strongly to this process (also outside the 
CICOS context). First of all this means devel-
oping a stringent but differentiated posi-
tion on Inga 3 and Grand Inga. This has not 
been easy, because such projects always pre-
sent tricky and uncomfortable questions 
of principle. 
Major dam construction is booming again 
in Africa and Asia, but European states and 
Western donors hesitate to support such 
projects. Mega-dams are potential political 
minefields, as they can exacerbate socio-
economic tensions and are frequently im-
posed against popular resistance. Grave 
technical, financial, social and ecological 
objections to such projects are frequently 
overridden for political motives. This can 
result in problems such as unsuitable loca-
tion (for instance the construction of Iraq’s 
Mosul Dam on soluble rock), exploding 
costs (Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam cost one-
third more than originally estimated), 
large-scale forced displacement (China’s 
Three Gorges Dam forced 1.5 million 
people to leave their homes), or huge and 
irreparable ecological harm (such as the 
dramatic decline in downstream Nile fish 
stocks after completion of Egypt’s Aswan 
High Dam). 
Many of these concerns about large dams 
are undoubtedly justified, but the ostensibly 
rigorous opposition of certain European 
states goes no further than denying direct 
political or financial support to such 
projects. The credibility of this position is 
limited, because European companies and 
consortia – alongside the Chinese – are pro-
minently involved in realising these highly 
controversial, immensely expensive dam-
building ventures. In some cases they are 
even able to secure their investments with 
state export credit guarantees. Examples 
include German guarantees for compo-
nents for the Sogamoso Dam in Colombia 
(2012) and Italian guarantees for the Itare 
Dam in Kenya (2015). In both these cases 
the feasibility and environmental impact 
studies were superficial and the findings 
whitewashed. Another issue is longer-term 
consistency. For instance about ten years 
ago the World Bank refused to fund the 
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Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). 
Addis Ababa responded by financing con-
struction largely on its own – and since 
2015 the World Bank has been openly 
considering funding transmission lines to 
other parts of the country and neighbour-
ing states. While there may be plausible 
reasons for such a pragmatic turn, it sends 
a completely wrong message to states con-
sidering similar projects.  
This fundamentally negative yet inconsist-
ent attitude can neither restrict nor prevent 
problematic dam-building projects. Instead 
it makes European states and international 
donors into unreliable onlookers, whose 
influence on the shape of projects as they 
unfold is limited at best. At the same time 
Saudi Arabia for example is involved in Su-
danese projects on the Nile, while China 
takes care of financing in Zambia and Ghana. 
In or Out 
Grand Inga is a manifestation of prestige-
driven infrastructure megalomania, and 
comes with a string of risks. Its enormous 
price tag of u50–60 billion begs compari-
son, and appears absolutely absurd against 
DRC’s current state budget of u5.8 billion. 
Despite the involvement of external inves-
tors, it will enlarge DRC’s budget deficit. At 
least 35,000 people will have to be relocated 
in the course of the project. Yet the popu-
lation is last in the queue for electricity 
distribution, because the mammoth project 
has focused from the outset on major users 
and investors. According to the original 
plans for Inga 3, 2,500 MW was to be ex-
ported to South Africa and another 1,300 
MW was earmarked for DRC’s mining 
industry, leaving only 1,000 MW – or about 
one-fifth – for all households and other 
business sectors. Once transmission losses 
are factored in, the population’s share 
could fall to less than 100 MW. Meanwhile, 
the rich fish stocks downstream from the 
dam are endangered. 
At the same time, the project stands out 
positively in a number of respects: The large 
drop at the Inga Falls, high water pressure 
and the enormous flow velocity of the Congo 
mean that the plant will achieve a relatively 
high degree of efficiency with a compara-
tively modest ecological intervention. As 
the dam lies on the lower reaches, negative 
downstream effects will be restricted to a 
relatively short 150 kilometre stretch. The 
run-of-river system proposed for Inga 3 
requires a comparatively small reservoir. 
And finally it is a regional project from 
which several states stand to benefit. 
Despite financing difficulties, Inga 3 
remains a priority for DRC. Grand Inga will 
also be realised sooner or later; the ques-
tion is no longer whether, but when. Ger-
many and its European partners need to 
quickly arrive at a clear decision: do the 
undoubtedly grave technical and financial 
reservations and ecological and socio-eco-
nomic drawbacks preclude involvement? 
If so, it is politically untenable to support 
companies involved in supplying compo-
nents, to participate in post-construction 
activities or to grant export credit guaran-
tees. If such a position is to have an impact 
it needs to be maintained consistently over 
time. 
The alternative is to explore ways in 
which this comparatively climate-friendly 
and inexpensive form of electricity genera-
tion in the Congo river basin can be lent 
political, technical and/or financial support 
and encouragement. In that event, measures 
and standards demanded – such as inde-
pendent and thorough feasibility studies – 
must actually be observed, even if this 
requires alterations to the design. 
Whatever position is eventually adopted, 
close long-term cooperation with the Congo 
Basin states on water resource issues will 
demand a clear-cut stance on the central 
and sensitive question of hydro-power. A 
distinct position of that nature is the pre-
condition for offered advice to be heard – 
and consequently to contribute to a process 
where technical limits of the project are 
discussed, benefits shared with the popu-
lation, and impacts on the Congo ecosys-
tem limited. 
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